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Abstract
As tariffs have fallen, subsidies and related policies with similar effect are being used to support local production. This raises
the question of whether the existing World Trade Organization (WTO) ‘rules of the game’ are adequate. Assessing the eco-
nomic effects of subsidies is complicated, given the need to consider linkages within and across supply-chain networks. Many
of the policies that affect supply-chain operations are not considered subsidies under the WTO. There are no rules on subsi-
dies for services or investment incentives by local governments. Conversely, some WTO rules may not be appropriate or effec-
tive given the increasing prevalence of global value chains. The widespread use of subsidies post-2008 suggests WTO
members should launch a process of deliberation to revisit the status quo set of multilateral rules on subsidies. The 2015 Nair-
obi WTO ministerial declaration has created the necessary window to permit interested countries to do so. A central element
of this should involve a concerted effort to collect better data and to analyze how subsidies and policies with equivalent
effect impact on value chains, whether negative international spillovers are created and, if so, their magnitude and incidence.
Policy Implications
• Value-chain-based production and trade are changing the incentives of governments to use different trade policy instru-
ments.
• WTO rules on subsidies need to be revisited as a result of the rising role of global value chains.
• More policy attention and resources must be devoted to international data collection and monitoring of the use of sub-
sidy policies.
• Too much attention is being given to traditional trade-policy instruments like tariffs and antidumping – and too little to
the use of different types of subsidies and measures with equivalent effect.
• Policies targeting trade in services and investment are not subject to multilateral disciplines even though these are likely
to have negative impacts globally on welfare and efﬁciency.
Trade policy post-2008 crisis
The use of subsidies by governments expanded dramatically
after the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, with many governments bail-
ing out their ﬁnancial sectors and providing subsidies to
support certain manufacturing activities, most notably and
visibly the automotive sector. While a direct response to a
major ﬁnancial/demand shock, the use of subsidy instru-
ments – broadly deﬁned to include ﬁscal measures such as
tax exemptions and investment incentives such as tax holi-
days for new investment in a region – has been a constant
feature of government policy in both high-income and
emerging economies. This takes different forms in different
countries, depending in part on ﬁscal and administrative
capacity. A common feature is that intervention is often
non-transparent.
Motivations underlying efforts to promote certain types of
economic activity in a jurisdiction include a desire to gener-
ate employment and investments that are deemed desirable
from an economic growth and development perspective.
These often include ‘high-tech’- and ‘green-tech’-oriented
activities, and more generally a desire to ‘move up’ the
value chain (VC) by encouraging investment in innovation
or activities that generate higher productivity and thus
higher-paying jobs. The employment objective is often cen-
tral in assistance programs targeting small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), the main source of employment in
most countries. Examples of frequently used policies include
government procurement policies; for example, giving price
preferences to local ﬁrms or to ﬁrms that generate the high-
est local content, and locational investment tax/subsidy
instruments. Frequently used examples of the latter are long
tax holidays, ﬁnancial guarantees or provision of services at
below market rates.
Developments in the global trade landscape are discussed
brieﬂy in the next section, with particular focus on the
emergence of international production networks and VCs,
and the associated increase in the share of trade in interme-
diate products and services. I then provide a snapshot of
recently compiled data on the use of various kinds of subsi-
dies by governments following the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
These illustrate that subsidies are widely used, mostly by
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richer countries, and relatively more frequently for services
than for goods. My analysis then turns to extant multilateral
rules in the WTO for subsidies – the Agreement on Subsi-
dies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) – and discusses
their salience for a world in which VC-based production
accounts for an increasing share of global trade. The focus
is on the WTO because (with the notable exception of the
EU) most preferential trade agreements (PTAs) do little to
discipline the use of subsidies. Very little is known regarding
the motivations for the use of subsidies or the magnitude
and incidence of negative spillovers created by subsidy poli-
cies. Matters are complex because it is necessary to take
into account the linkages within and across VC networks.
Determining the net effects of sectoral or ﬁrm-speciﬁc gov-
ernment policies is more complicated than in a world where
trade is based on countries or industries specializing accord-
ing to comparative advantage. In a VC world, there may be
efﬁciency reasons for governments to intervene in a tar-
geted or speciﬁc manner – for example, to address coordi-
nation failures – and such interventions may beneﬁt foreign
plants or ﬁrms, their workers and local communities. Nega-
tive spillovers can and will occur, as will deadweight losses,
but their incidence may be unclear ex ante, making it difﬁ-
cult to assess or identify rules of thumb for possible multi-
lateral disciplines.
The economic rationale for the multilateral subsidy rules
embedded in the WTO has been challenged by scholars
using analytical frameworks that do not consider global VCs
(e.g. Sykes, 2010). Whatever one’s views on this question,
the greater complexity of international production that is
associated with VCs implies that many of the elements of
the ASCM may need to be revisited. The ﬁnal section argues
that the many open questions pertaining to the use and
effects of subsidies suggest that WTO members consider
engaging in a ‘discovery process’ – putting in place mecha-
nisms that provide ﬁrms and governments with a forum in
which to discuss the effects of nontariff policies on invest-
ment decisions and the operation of VCs. A precondition for
determining whether new disciplines are needed in the area
of subsidies, broadly deﬁned, is better information and
much more empirical research on the magnitude and inci-
dence of negative international spillovers that are created
by prevailing policies.
The rise of VCs in international trade
Trade patterns and paradigms have shifted in recent years,
with increasing fragmentation of global production along
VCs. An international VC involves a collection of ﬁrms
(plants) located in different countries jointly forming a ‘pro-
duction line’, with different parts of the production process
undertaken by ﬁrms (plants) in different countries. Depend-
ing on the location of a ﬁrm (country) in a VC/production
network, participation may either involve forward linkages
(where an activity produces an output that is used in pro-
duction for export to another nation) or backward linkages
(where a ﬁrm uses imported parts and components that are
inputs for production that is exported). An example is a
country A that produces hides from cattle that are tanned
and dyed in a neighboring country B using chemicals
imported from a third country C, with the leather produced
in B used in the production of a car seat cover in country D
that is shipped to a car plant located in country E that
exports the cars to country F.
A VC permits enterprises in different countries to concen-
trate on (specialize in) speciﬁc tasks and activities without
having to source required inputs locally or integrating verti-
cally to produce and market the end product. A VC
increases interdependence: each link in a chain relies on the
upstream producers delivering their output on time and
meeting the required quality and safety standards; upstream
ﬁrms are dependent on the downstream segments working
efﬁciently, as stoppages or distribution problems there will
affect the demand for inputs. The supply chain trade (SCT)
associated with outsourcing and investment location deci-
sions by large manufacturing and retailers (so-called lead
ﬁrms) is often predominantly regional in nature (i.e. cen-
tered on Europe, North America and East Asia), although
most VCs will embody at least some content that is pro-
duced outside the region.
The growth in SCT has been supported by – indeed, is
dependent on – cross-border movement of capital and
knowledge (as the technology and know-how needed to
undertake the various activities is often ﬁrm-speciﬁc). The
increase in VC production is highly correlated with an
expansion in foreign direct investment (FDI) (UNCTAD,
2013). The global value of the stock of FDI increased more
than sixfold in the last decade or so; local sales by foreign-
owned ﬁrms were some US$26 trillion in 2012, compared to
US$18 trillion for world merchandise trade.
Companies are the drivers of trade of international com-
merce. It is ﬁrms that invest and create the employment
needed to undertake production activities and ‘do trade’ –
ranging from smallholder farmers, to microenterprises and
SMEs that provide a variety of inputs, to logistics providers,
processors, manufacturers and service suppliers. SCT is dom-
inated by large multinational companies or lead ﬁrms that
decide where to locate plants, where to invest, who to
source from, and so on. Some 80 per cent of world trade is
estimated to involve multinational companies (UNCTAD,
2013). All of these ﬁrms source inputs and buy services from
local suppliers and subcontractors. As a result, much SCT is
‘indirect’: the value of a ﬁnal good incorporates payments
for many intermediate goods and services that are not
exported directly. Thus, a wide range of ﬁrms and sectors,
including companies providing services to ﬁrms in other
sectors, beneﬁt from and are affected by VC-based trade
and investment opportunities. Available data indicate that
about one third of the value of all traded manufactured
goods reﬂect the value of embodied services, and that,
overall, if account is taken of sales of services by foreign
afﬁliates, services account for more than 50 per cent of
world trade (Francois and Hoekman, 2010).
One result of the increase in SCT is that imports make up
an increasing share of the total value embodied in a given
product: ranging from 25 per cent to 40 per cent or more
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for small open economies that are integrated into supply
chains (OECD, 2013). SCT can be broken down into imports
of inputs that are used in the production of exports (‘back-
ward linkages’) and exports of intermediates that are pro-
cessed in the importing nation and then exported to a third
country (‘forward linkages’). The relative magnitude of each
of these types of trade varies signiﬁcantly across countries,
as does the overall share of supply-chain networks in total
trade. The differences reﬂect a number of factors, including
economic size, level of development, location and policy.
Countries that are far away from centers of economic
demand and activity will also have lower participation in
supply chains because of relatively high transport costs. If a
country imposes high trade barriers or pursues industrial
policies that make it difﬁcult and more costly to import
parts or components, investors may decline to invest there.
The structure and volume of SCT is very sensitive to trade
and other transaction costs – both direct ﬁnancial and oper-
ating costs, and costs associated with the management of
the associated networks. Reliability and predictability of
ﬂows of goods and services within the relevant networks is
critical. Uncertainty and risks of incurring delays associated
with unpredictable operating environments give rise to a
need to maintain higher stocks and other forms of hedging
and insurance, the costs of which may preclude SCT invest-
ments. Differences in the operating environment do much
to explain why VC investment and production tend to be
regionally concentrated, and why SCT in most of Africa and
much of Latin America and South Asia is limited compared
to North America, Europe and East Asia.
Policy in a supply-chain world is more complex than in
one where trade is of a ‘ship and forget’ nature and traded
products are produced using local factors of production and
locally produced inputs. An open trade regime becomes
more important, as does action to minimize trade frictions
such as delays in border clearance, low-quality transport and
logistics that lead to physical losses, and difﬁculties in invest-
ing in operating or distribution facilities. Connectivity –
including the quality of transport and logistics services,
information and communications technology (ICT) networks
and related services – is a critical determinant of competi-
tiveness. Particularly relevant for the subject of this article is
that the policy agenda is about more than reducing trade
costs. There may be a need for speciﬁc types of government
intervention to address coordination failures. Subsidies may
be part of the set of instruments that can be used to
address VC-speciﬁc market failures.
Potential rationales for government intervention
The set of policies that can act to promote an economic
activity is very large. Any measure by a government to dis-
advantage one activity relative to another will have the
effect of subsidizing the latter. It is therefore necessary to
recognize that if one seeks to discipline subsidies that give
rise to negative international spillovers, the focus of atten-
tion must go beyond narrowly deﬁned ﬁscal transfers. In the
WTO context, an actionable subsidy is a measure that
imposes a burden on the budget, is speciﬁc to an activity
(as opposed to beneﬁting economic activity more generally)
and conveys a beneﬁt to those targeted. Subsidies that have
an economy-wide impact and are not speciﬁc (education,
general infrastructure, and basic research and development)
are not actionable. Speciﬁc subsidies might include support
for exports or local content requirements (reducing incen-
tives to import); targeted ﬁnancial support, such as grants or
loans from publicly capitalized banks; ﬁscal incentives such
as grants or preferential ﬁnancing to ‘encourage’ industries
into expand higher-technology exports; tax incentives that
promote particular activities or technologies; investments in
supporting economic infrastructure; aid schemes for SMEs;
export credit insurance; state aid for in the form of loan
guarantees for speciﬁc products; ad hoc rescue and restruc-
turing aid, and so on. From an economic perspective,
notwithstanding that this is a rather long list of measures,
any policy that has differential effects across sectors or activ-
ities will act as a tax or subsidy, suggesting that any list of
subsidies will be incomplete.
Subsidies that are sector-speciﬁc may have an economy-
wide objective. Examples include subsidies to sectors such
as health, education, transportation and communications.
Conversely, subsidies that are economy-wide in scope may
effectively be industry-speciﬁc; for example, the pursuit of
an environmental objective whose attainment requires taxes
or subsidies that primarily affect speciﬁc sectors such as the
chemical or automotive industries. It may well be that other
policies maintained by the government outweigh any direct
support given to a ﬁrm or sector. Such general equilibrium
measures of the net or ‘effective’ support that is implied by
policy is important in assessing impacts on ﬁrms and on the
rest of the world. What matters then is the effect of all poli-
cies taken together: do they stimulate or support a speciﬁc
activity? If so, what matters from a rule-making perspective
is whether they have a signiﬁcant negative welfare impact
on other countries and/or the world as a whole.
Subsidies are used for many reasons. They may be moti-
vated by economic (efﬁciency) or non-economic goals (for
example, to redistribute income in an effort to improve the
equity of outcomes, or to buy political support or to create
rents for politically well-connected individuals or groups.
Policies that reﬂect rent seeking or rent creation will usually
be market-distorting if they affect production. Policies that
reﬂect economic objectives may or may not be market-dis-
torting. A basic efﬁciency rationale for tax-subsidy schemes
is to bring marginal private costs or beneﬁts into alignment
with marginal social costs or beneﬁts. The need for this
arises when externalities (market failures) cause social and
private costs and beneﬁts to diverge, so that private agents
are not given an incentive to take into account the costs or
beneﬁts of their actions on others in the economy. Neces-
sary conditions for a more efﬁcient allocation of resources
to result from intervention are that the problem is diag-
nosed correctly and the policy is targeted appropriately. In
practice governments can easily fail of these tests, especially
if account is taken of the incentives of interest groups to
lobby for a subsidy or a tax exemption.
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VCs and subsidy-like policies
Theoretical or empirical research on subsidies within a VC
environment is very sparse. The limited extant literature
tends to focus on trade policy (tariffs) not subsidies, with
the exception of investment and location subsidies. The pol-
icy literature has noted that vertical specialization changes
the incentive structure confronting ﬁrms and thus govern-
ments. The expansion of SCT, in conjunction with the associ-
ated ﬂows of FDI, is expected to attenuate the incentives to
use traditional trade policy instruments like tariffs. Being
able to compete in a speciﬁc niche or value-adding activity
requires that ﬁrms integrate into the relevant production
networks. Signiﬁcant levels of import protection would
impede their ability to do so as it would increase the cost of
inputs. In a recent empirical analysis, Gawande et al. (2015)
showed that the intensity of a country’s vertical specializa-
tion helps explain observed trade policy responses to the
2008 crisis as well as the level of trade protection pre-crisis.
SCT may increase incentives for governments to use sub-
sidies and subsidy-like instruments to target speciﬁc domes-
tic economic activities. Analogous to tariffs and import
protection, these may create negative international spillovers
– for example, subsidies and similar policies to attract SCT-
linked FDI that generates incentive competition between
governments.
Baldwin and Venables (2015) provide a framework for
analyzing the interaction of forward and backward linkages
within and across supply chains. This is important for con-
sidering the effects and design of policy because inputs will
usually enter into multiple supply chains (multiple sectors).
Thus, services are used in the production of many different
products, and vice versa: the ﬁnal products produced by
many VCs will require common inputs.1 They focus on the
effects of different trade and industrial policy instruments
and show that linkages across VCs create multiplier effects.
For example, support for ﬁnal-goods producers can increase
the range of parts and intermediate inputs produced in a
territory, broadening the industrial base and attracting the
entry of further downstream goods producers. Policies that
on the margin expand the range of upstream inputs that
are produced are likely to generate more industrialization
than policies that promote parts production within the mar-
gin (parts that are already produced domestically), or parts
far beyond the margin (highly sophisticated parts that are
not used in locally produced ﬁnal goods but are all exported
within a given VC).
Baldwin and Venables demonstrate that policies that sup-
port (subsidize) local production of intermediate inputs can
result in an expansion of the industrial base. This includes
incentives to attract VC FDI, with the impact on SCT partici-
pation depending on the range of available input produc-
tion capabilities in the host country and whether policies
targeting entry of FDI result in demand for locally produced
inputs that allows the producers concerned to become com-
petitive intra-VC suppliers (by allowing them to expand the
scale of production). Policies that expand the range of parts
and inputs (that is, the extensive margin) are more likely to
result in expansion of the industrial base. However, as is the
case in the strategic trade literature of the 1980s and 1990s,
policy can easily get it wrong and result in adverse (welfare-
reducing) effects.
This is illustrated in a recent analysis of the effects of
steel-sector industrial policy in major steel-producing coun-
tries from 1975 to 2000. Bloningen (2015) examines the
impact of policies to support local steel production on the
export competitiveness of downstream manufacturing sec-
tors that are signiﬁcant users of steel. He ﬁnds that a one-
standard-deviation increase in the use of export subsidies
and non-tariff barriers leads to a 3.6 per cent decline in
export competitiveness for an average downstream manu-
facturing sector. But this negative effect can be as high as a
50 per cent decline for sectors that use steel as an input
most intensively. Conversely, policies that target down-
stream activities may be to the detriment of upstream sup-
pliers, especially if the former have market (monopsony)
power – as is the case with automobiles, for example (Van
Biesebroek and Sturgeon, 2010).
There has been extensive research on tax and subsidy
policies targeting FDI, but most of this work does not con-
sider production that is organized in multi-country VCs.2 The
upshot of much of this ‘non-VC’ literature is that differences
in tax regimes and FDI incentive schemes have an economic
impact in that they are one factor explaining the allocation
of FDI across jurisdictions.3 There are a number of possible
efﬁciency (welfare-improving) rationales for FDI subsidy poli-
cies. These center around positive spillovers that are associ-
ated with FDI, with intervention justiﬁed either because of
market failures or as a second-best instrument to create
incentives for FDI in locations where this would have a high
social return, including by generating positive agglomeration
externalities. For example, Hauﬂer and Mittermaier (2011)
show that subsidies to FDI may give trade unions an incen-
tive to exert wage restraint in exchange for additional jobs
that are created in the newly attracted ﬁrms. A subsidy that
more than compensates a ﬁrm for higher wage costs can
not only induce a foreign investor to locate in the unionized
country, but also generate the incentive for the union to
choose to lower wages and get the FDI as opposed to a sit-
uation where wages are higher and employment is lower.
At the same time the literature also points to the poten-
tial for welfare-reducing subsidy competition between juris-
dictions. For example, Ossa (2015) analyzes the effects of
investment-related tax/subsidy incentives at the state level
in the US. US states ‘spend’ some US$80 billion a year on
tax incentives and subsidies to investment, reﬂecting a vig-
orous competition to attract investment. Ossa ﬁnds that this
competition increases state-level welfare (by attracting ﬁrms,
increasing employment and raising wages) but generates
beggar-thy-neighbor effects. While there are large potential
gains at the state level from subsidizing investment, this dis-
torts resource allocation by making intermediate inputs too
cheap and generating excessive entry. There is a signiﬁcant
cost to the US as a whole: if states were to refrain from sub-
sidy competition, manufacturing real income in the US as a
whole would be 3.9 per cent higher.
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Although investment subsidies may be costly, they can
generate the outcomes that are sought by governments,
such as local employment. Criscuolo et al. (2012) estimate
the impact of a ‘regional selective assistance’ program that
offers investment subsidies to ﬁrms in depressed areas on
condition they create or safeguard manufacturing jobs in
these areas. Area eligibility is governed by EU state aid rules.
Periodic changes in these rules allow the authors to con-
struct instrumental variables for program participation and
identify causality. Using two decades of UK panel data on
the population of ﬁrms and matching these to program par-
ticipants, Criscuolo et al. ﬁnd positive effects on employ-
ment, investment and net entry. A 10 per cent investment
subsidy generates about a 7 per cent increase in manufac-
turing employment (around 100,000 a year). The ‘cost per
job’ was estimated at US$6,300, suggesting that in some
respects investment subsidies can be cost-effective. This
illustrates the difﬁculty of achieving international (or intra-
national) cooperation; this would be easier to achieve if poli-
cies were ineffective.
Moran (2014) focuses on the available evidence on the
role and effects of policies that target FDI using an SCT lens.
Coordination failures, information asymmetries, missing
inputs of both a general (cross-sectoral) and very speciﬁc
nature that are critical to VC production and SCT, and uncer-
tainty regarding the policy stance, goals and capacity of a
government may all be prevalent in a country or jurisdiction
and call for proactive policy. A central feature of such policy
from an FDI-attraction perspective will be to address the
constraints that impede FDI (entry, establishment) and that
limit the extent to which investors create and grow back-
ward linkages – that is, connect with local suppliers of
inputs (both goods and services). VC opportunities and
related spillovers provide another rationale for creating an
environment that is attractive to FDI. In a VC world, invest-
ment promotion becomes particularly important and this
may need to go beyond the provision of information, reduc-
ing uncertainty on the business environment and ensuring
efﬁcient trade facilitation. Targeting investment by ﬁrst-tier
suppliers of lead ﬁrms and contract manufacturers and pro-
viding support for the creation of back ward linkages are
two examples of policies that can help expand national SCT
trade and VC participation (Gerefﬁ, 2014; Farole and Winkler,
2014).4
VCs differ from the standard context analyzed in the older
trade and development literature as they involve (sets of)
ﬁrms and plants in many countries. Instead of value added
being mostly national, in a VC world the value of a ﬁnal pro-
duct is generated in many countries that are part of a net-
work. Thus, interventions that expand the ability of a
country to provide a greater share of total inputs may have
both positive local spillover effects, and at the same time,
assuming a government does so effectively and enhances
the competitiveness of the VC as a whole, give rise to posi-
tive as well as negative cross-border spillovers (Van Biese-
broeck, 2009).5 The direction and size (distribution) of
spillover effects will depend on linkages across countries
within a VC and linkages across chains – both competing
VCs and non-competing chains that may use the same type
of inputs or that are buyers of what another VC produces.
The limited research literature suggests that although
negative spillovers are very likely to be created by FDI
incentives, governments seeking to expand national SCT
participation can use policy to increase investment and
employment.6 In that sense, there is nothing new about VCs
as regards the potential beneﬁts of cooperation on rules of
the game. But such cooperation is likely to be harder to
design, given that the distributional and efﬁciency effects
are more difﬁcult to determine ex ante and the potential
greater scope or need for targeted interventions to address
coordination failures that may impede FDI or SCT
investments.
Investment incentives are likely to play a particularly
important role in a VC context. These need not involve
direct ﬁscal transfers. Even if they do, that will only be one
element of the set of measures that may be needed if the
goal is to address coordination and other market failures.
VC-related interventions to address such failures may also
need to be very speciﬁc. While this reduces the potential for
white elephants, as discussed later, targeting also implies
that speciﬁc policies that are welfare-enhancing may fall foul
of WTO rules.
Use of subsidies: a post-2008 snapshot
Data on subsidies are notoriously patchy and incomplete.
One very useful recent source of data on the use of subsi-
dies and related policy instruments is the Global Trade Alert
(GTA).7 What follows discusses the information that is
reported in that database. No effort is made to assess the
magnitude, let alone the effects of subsidies; the aim is sim-
ply to determine the relative intensity of the use of subsi-
dies by looking at the number of subsidy measures
imposed, how this varies across countries as a function of
per-capita income, and the distribution of measures by
broad sector of economic activity (goods vs services). It
should be stressed that the approach used to do this is very
rudimentary and purely exploratory. The GTA data only
starts in 2009 and much of what is reported are policies put
in place as a response to the ﬁnancial crisis; we cannot com-
pare with the ‘steady-state’ use of subsidies before the crisis.
However, the same is true for the trade policy measures that
are registered in the database. The relative importance of
subsidies and measures with equivalent effect is most prob-
ably seriously underestimated in the data because the mea-
sures are not weighted by economic impact, and trade
policy measures taken by the EU are counted separately for
each EU member state. Thus, an antidumping duty imposed
by the EU is counted 28 times, while a subsidy implemented
by an EU member is counted only once. For these reasons,
the share of subsidies in total measures is biased downward
substantially.
Figure 1 and Table 1 report information on all trade-
related measures that have been collected by the GTA as of
April 2015. These spanned a total of 22,569 measures, rang-
ing from tariffs and quotas to antidumping and investment
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incentives. Tariffs and contingent protection (‘trade reme-
dies’ or ‘temporary barriers to trade’ – antidumping, mea-
sures to countervail the effects of subsidies and safeguards)
account for two thirds (67 per cent) of all measures
imposed. Four subsidy categories are distinguished in the
GTA database (state aids, consumption subsidies, export
subsidies and import subsidies). Taken together, these
accounted for 14.3 per cent of all measures imposed (for a
total of 3,234 measures), the third most frequently used pol-
icy instrument in the post-2008 period. For high-income,
non-Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries, subsidies are the second most fre-
quently used instrument after tariff measures.8
Almost one third (29 per cent) of the subsidies used tar-
get exports (Table 1). Not surprisingly, high-income coun-
tries make more use of subsidies than lower-income
economies. Subsidies account for 21.8 per cent of all mea-
sures imposed by rich countries that are not a member of
the OECD, whereas they account for only 5 per cent of the
measures used by low-income countries. Although subsidies
account for 10 per cent or less of all measures imposed by
developing countries, the share of export subsidies rises as
per-capita incomes decline, suggesting that poor developing
countries are more focused on directly promoting export
competitiveness. Investment measures account for only 4.2
per cent of all measures for the sample as a whole, but
account for around 12 per cent of all measures imposed by
lower-middle-income and low-income countries.9 Taken
together, measures to provide trade ﬁnance, allocate pro-
curement to domestic ﬁrms, local content requirements and
investment policy actions account for 24.8 and 18.4 per cent
of all measures taken by lower-middle-income and low-
income countries, respectively – a much higher proportion
of all measures than is observed in richer countries.
Not surprisingly (given that services cannot be affected by
tariffs or temporary trade restrictions like antidumping), sub-
sidies and other ‘non-border’ measures are used more inten-
sively for services. For the sample as a whole, subsidies
account for about one third of all measures pertaining to
services. Investment measures account for another third.
The biggest difference in instrument use between the goods
and services sectors is for investment measures.10 Here
again, high-income countries, both OECD and non-OECD,
make the most intensive use of subsidies: around 50 per
cent of all measures targeting services are subsidies. Lower-
income countries, in contrast, rely primarily on investment
Table 1. Number of subsidy measures by country group and shares, 2009–2014
Country group All OECD Other HIC UMIC LMIC LIC
State aid 2205 1147 484 399 149 4
Consumption subsidy 30 4 14 7 5 0
Export subsidy 938 349 130 258 180 11
Import subsidy 61 20 8 18 14 0
Shares (%)
All subsidies (% of total) 14.3 15.9 21.8 11.1 10.6 4.7
Of which, export subsidies 29.0 23.0 20.4 37.8 51.7 73.3
Other measures, number and share (%)
Tariffs 8518 (37.7) 3238 (34.0) 1087 (37.3) 2852 (46.3) 1037 (31.5) 153 (47.8)
TTBs 3707 (16.4) 2126 (22.3) 424 (14.6) 779 (12.7) 286 (8.7) 0 (0.0)
QR/TRQ/import bans 2933 (13.0) 1807 (19.0) 411 (14.1) 486 (7.9) 133 (4.0) 13 (4.1)
Trade ﬁnance, procurement, LCRs, investment measures 1978 (8.8) 440 (4.6) 172(5.9) 493 (8.0) 814 (24.8) 59 (18.4)
HIC, high-income countries; UMIC, upper-middle-income countries; LMIC, lower-middle-income countries; LIC, lower-income countries; TTB, tem-
porary trade barriers; QR, quantitative import restrictions; TRQ, tariff rate quota; LCRs, local content requirements.
Source: GTA, March 2015.
Figure 1. Use of Different Measures, All Countries, 2009–2014 (% share).
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measures, which account for more than 60 per cent of all
measures used in lower-middle-income and low-income
countries targeting service sectors.
The data that have been discussed pertain to the use of
different instruments. In practice the policy action that is
involved may have the effect of reducing or increasing
trade. The GTA includes a code that reﬂects the assessment
of the compilers of the database as to whether the measure
restrains or expands trade, or the effect is ambiguous. These
assessments are based on ﬁrst principles, not on an analysis
of estimated effects. Thus, a reduction in a tariff is regarded
as liberalizing (coded ‘green’ in the GTA), whereas an
increase in a tariff would be coded as ‘red’. For some instru-
ments virtually all measures are trade-restrictive. This is the
case for antidumping and other temporary trade barriers,
for example. There are interesting differences in the ‘direc-
tion’ of policy across instruments and country groups. For
tariffs, many of the actions taken by high-income countries
and upper-middle-income countries involve liberalization –
some 70 per cent or more of all observations. This is also
the case for quotas and tariff rate quotas. In contrast lower-
middle-income countries tend to be more restrictive, with
more than 50 per cent of observations coded red.
As far as state aid and investment measures are con-
cerned, the aim of policy is on average more trade-restric-
tive or discriminatory than is the case for traditional trade
policies (abstracting from antidumping and other contingent
trade policies). Some 70 per cent of subsidy measures taken
by richer countries are discriminatory; for lower-middle-
income countries the share is 100 per cent. In contrast,
investment measures taken by lower-income developing
countries are much more weighted towards reducing
discrimination against foreign ﬁrms, while in OECD countries
and upper-middle-income nations there is rough balance
between liberalizing and more discrimination. As far as ser-
vices are concerned, subsidies are almost all coded red, i.e.
they involve discrimination in favor of local ﬁrms, whereas
investment measures in developing nations are biased
towards liberalization. This is not the case for OECD coun-
tries, where a signiﬁcant share of investment-policy mea-
sures involves an increase in discrimination or
restrictiveness.
Implications for current WTO rules
WTO disciplines relating to subsidies on goods have a two-
fold objective. First, to establish rules to avoid or reduce
adverse effects on members and, more speciﬁcally, to pre-
vent the use of subsidies to nullify or impair concessions.
Second, to regulate the use of countervailing duties (CVDs)
by members seeking to offset the injurious effects of foreign
subsidization of products on their domestic ﬁrms. Adverse
effects include injury to a domestic industry, nulliﬁcation or
impairment of tariff concessions, or serious prejudice to the
country’s interests. Serious prejudice is deﬁned to exist if
the total ad valorem subsidization of a product exceeds 5
per cent; subsidies are used to cover the operating losses of
a ﬁrm or industry; or debt relief is granted for government-
held liabilities. Serious prejudice may arise if the subsidy
reduces the exports of WTO members, results in signiﬁcant
price undercutting or increases the world market share of
the subsidizing country in a primary product. The focus of
WTO disciplines in cases of prejudice is on the amount of
the assistance given, not on the extent to which a subsidy
harms trading partners. The General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) has no subsidy disciplines for services. While
basic disciplines such as the most-favored-nation rule and
national treatment may apply to speciﬁc service sectors if
these are scheduled, in practice subsidy measures are likely
to be carved out through a ‘limitation on national
treatment’.
The ASCM is premised on trade involving goods that are
produced in one country and sold to another, i.e. implicitly
if not explicitly (most) value added is assumed to be gener-
ated from domestic factors of production. This is not the
case for VC-based SCT. As a result, it is less clear who bene-
ﬁts from a ‘subsidy’. Is it the VC as a whole, with the impact
reﬂected in the ﬁnal good? Or is the impact on speciﬁc seg-
ments only? Given the potential substitutability and/or com-
plementarity of policy instruments, it becomes necessary to
consider a broader set of policies and whether these as a
whole generate negative spillovers – most notably invest-
ment incentives. In any such assessment, the ﬁrst order of
business is to identify and deﬁne the spillovers that are of
concern.
WTO rules require a ﬁnding that a domestic industry is
being injured by a foreign subsidy before a CVD can be
imposed. VCs involve complex relationships between the
links in the chain or nodes of the network that ensure relia-
bility of supply, quality, interconnection and so on. There-
fore, domestic-input suppliers that are not part of a VC that
imports parts or components may not beneﬁt from taking
action against subsidized imported inputs used by a VC. The
end result may simply be that the relevant lead ﬁrm simply
absorbs the cost of a CVD or else moves production else-
where.11
As FDI policy is an important aspect of VC or SCT-related
policies, an issue from a WTO perspective is that local incen-
tives to attract investment are not covered by WTO rules.
The focus of WTO subsidy rules is on whether interventions
are export subsidies, or cause adverse effects for exporters
in third markets or domestic import-competing producers.
But if the main goal and effect of SCT-promoting policies is
to attract or retain FDI, the issue becomes one of invest-
ment diversion and global efﬁciency; cooperation aimed at
preventing inefﬁcient competition between jurisdictions that
simply generates rent transfers to investors as opposed to
addressing a market failure.
An implication of the centrality of FDI and more generally
of investment for VCs is that discrimination (violating
national treatment) may be less of an inherent feature than
it is for trade policy. Governments may care less about the
nationality of owners of plants than they do about local
employment. The spillovers that may arise are therefore
somewhat different from those motivating many WTO rules
– a concern about the effects of policy on exporters. If the
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policy at hand in an investment incentive, effects are not
(only) on exporters but on locations for investment; that is,
the potential problem is investment diversion. Non-discrimi-
natory investment policies may be distorting by attracting
investment to less efﬁcient locations. Thus, if countries want
to level the playing ﬁeld, governments will need to sit down
and negotiate rules on investment incentives. Given the
importance of services as a source of value added and in
driving VCs, any such effort should span all sectors and
include a focus on subsidies for services.
This will be a very difﬁcult exercise, however, as it must
go beyond subsidies in the narrow sense of a ﬁscal transfer
as deﬁned in the ASCM and span a broader set of policies,
including investment incentives. Given the complexity of
determining the distributional effects of VC or SCT policy
interventions, the challenge of agreeing on rules ex ante will
include deﬁning what constitutes an undesirable spillover
and an assessment of the potential that different measures
will have to generate such spillovers.
The research discussed previously points to the existence
of negative spillovers and suggests a case for international
disciplines. But it is very much an open question whether
countries will agree that rules should be pursued. In the
WTO working group on investment, it became clear early on
that major OECD governments were not willing to discuss
investment incentive programs, removing much of the
potential rationale for a multilateral agreement (Hoekman
and Saggi, 2000). In a VC context, there may be even less
appetite to agree to disciplines, given that the high import
content of any given VC means investment subsidies will
beneﬁt foreign interests as well as local ones. While there
may well be investment diversion, documenting this is not
straightforward given the overall distorted operating
environment that is likely to reduce investment below what
it otherwise would be in many lower-income countries.
Matters are complicated further by the fact that SCT sub-
sides will be embedded in products – that is, the impact on
the end product is indirect and depends on the value share
of the subsidized activity in the total. The extent to which
services inputs and contributions to a VC beneﬁt from gov-
ernment support will need to be considered (on average,
services account for one third or more of the value of
goods) (OECD, 2013). Thus, to measure the effect of inter-
ventions, an analysis is needed of the sources of value
added or proﬁts. The size of the subsidy per se is not the
right focus. In addition, the notion of injury would need to
be revisited: given that a VC comprises a range of ﬁrms in
different countries, does it make sense to allow a ﬁrm (a set
of ﬁrms) that are not part of given VC to take action that is
aimed at inducing a lead ﬁrm to source from them as
opposed to the preferred suppliers if the action simply
makes the end product(s) less competitive on world mar-
kets, and may well induce the lead ﬁrm to pack up and
leave? From an FDI-attraction perspective, permitting ﬁrms
to launch CVD actions is likely to run counter to investment-
promotion objectives and have detrimental impacts on the
reputation of a country as a platform for VC-based activity.
Conclusions
A consequence of VC trade is that policy becomes more
complex to design and the impacts of subsidy policies are
more difﬁcult to assess than in a world where trade does
not involve vertical specialization and unbundling of produc-
tion activities across many locations. The trope that further
research and analysis is required applies here with a ven-
geance. A precondition for such analysis is much better data
on applied policies. Current data collection and reporting
effects are biased towards a subset of trade policy instru-
ments; the coverage and quality of data on subsidies and
investment measures/incentives is much lower than for tra-
ditional trade policies such as tariffs and ‘temporary’ trade
barriers.
Given interdependencies and linkages between the vari-
ous activities that are part and parcel of VCs, there may be
greater need for proactive policies. Many of these are the
well-known horizontal policies that center on the investment
climate, property rights, rule of law, skills, infrastructure, con-
nectivity and so on. However, speciﬁc interventions may be
needed as well, targeting coordination failures and missing
links. The policy mix may include investment incentives of a
ﬁscal nature, which may be efﬁcient and/or politically
rational from a local perspective of attracting ﬁrms and gen-
erating employment. But other policy measures that have
similar effects – including generating negative spillovers on
other countries and potential investment locations – may be
preferred by governments over narrowly deﬁned subsidies.
An example are tax concessions or credit guarantees offered
by municipal or provincial governments to foreign investors,
where there is extensive evidence that excessive competi-
tion between governments reduces aggregate welfare. Thus,
in so far as countries can agree that there are joint beneﬁts
to be had from cooperating on rules of the game in this
area, they will need to go beyond subsidies as deﬁned in
the WTO.
At present, the ASCM does not cover services and thus
misses a large part of what drives VCs and the value addi-
tion that occurs along a VC. It also does not cover FDI subsi-
dies. Nor does it address regulatory policies that may be
used to discriminate in favor of domestic economic activity.
The prevalence of VCs calls for policy analysis and interna-
tional cooperation to focus more on policies’ overall impact
on VCs. The main need at this point, however, is not to start
from the premise that new rules need to be negotiated, but
instead to determine how existing ASCM and other WTO
disciplines impact on SCT and whether there are signiﬁcant
negative spillovers stemming from national policies, includ-
ing measures put in place by sub-central governments. The
opening created by the 2015 Nairobi WTO ministerial con-
ference for WTO members to discuss both old and new
issues outside the framework and modalities established by
the Doha Development Agenda offers a good opportunity
to launch a discussion about whether changes should be
made in the multilateral disciplines that apply to subsidies
and related policies.
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A necessary condition for any such determination is much
better data on the policies that are used by governments
around the world, both at the central and sub-central levels.
That will require a shift in prioritization of the transparency
and monitoring efforts of international organizations, includ-
ing a concerted effort to map tax or subsidy policies that
affect or target FDI and service-sector activities. This will be
challenging given that WTO members have a poor record in
terms of reporting subsidy measures. The poor track record
suggests that greater support should be given to indepen-
dent efforts such as the GTA to collect and report data on
subsidies and related policy instruments.
Notes
I am grateful to an anonymous referee and to the editor for their help-
ful comments on an earlier draft, to Matteo Fiorini for putting together
the GTA data and Johannes Fritz for his assistance in making the data
available.
1. The economic literature on outsourcing, offshoring and trade in
tasks tends to limit attention to the unbundling of production pro-
cesses within an industry across multiple countries or locations, not
on cross-industry or cross-VC interactions that generate potential
spillovers as well as interdependencies.
2. See Blomstrom and Kokko (2003) for a review of much of the literature.
3. In a recent comprehensive study of the drivers of FDI stocks, Blonin-
gen and Piger (2014) conclude that most host-country business-
environment variables, including host-country infrastructure and
institutions, are not robust determinants of FDI. However, while they
consider the effects of trade and bilateral investment agreements,
they do not assess the importance of investment incentives.
4. The general literature on FDI already provides extensive evidence of its
positive effects (in both the goods and services sectors) on total factor
productivity (TFP), wages and so on. See, for example, Moran (2014).
5. McGuire (2014) documents how some countries have used selective
government intervention to help national ﬁrms accumulate the
expertise and experience needed to build a niche in speciﬁc seg-
ments of the international global aerospace VC, based in part on
collaboration with global players in the industry.
6. Subsidies may be a second-best device for governments to over-
come constraints that impede investment that they cannot affect.
An example of such a constraint is trade policy. A local government
cannot affect a nation’s trade policy, but this may be very important
from a VC or SCT perspective. Kimmitt and Slaughter (2015) note
that the limited number of PTAs negotiated by the US meant that
Audi set up a plant in Mexico instead of Tennessee, in part because
Mexico offered a location that had duty-free access to some 40
countries with which it had PTAs. In a VC world, what matters is
access to inputs and getting processed or ﬁnal products into export
markets duty-free. Investment incentives are a potential instrument
that a local government can use to offset speciﬁc locational or
operating disadvantages but as this example illustrates, that may
not be sufﬁcient.
7. See the GTA website, www.globaltradealert.org.
8. Note again that the focus here is on a simple ‘count’ of measures,
not on the value of the support granted or their effects. Given that
state aids during this period were often very large in value terms,
the implied share of subsidies vs other policies is a downward-
biased measure of the economic signiﬁcance of this instrument.
9. Table 1 provides data on all measures reported in the GTA
database. Investment measures include tax or subsidies for FDI and
policies affecting the ability of foreign ﬁrms to establish a commer-
cial presence.
10. In interpreting these data it should be recognized that services
account for only a small share of total measures covered by the
GTA database (6 per cent). The main focus of trade policy is, not
surprisingly, on goods.
11. Issues of transfer pricing will arise in assessing the extent to which
a subsidy has beneﬁted a given activity or the VC as a whole (the
price or cost of the ﬁnal good).
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